Accountability and political representation of national minorities: a forgotten link? : evidence from Romania by Cârstocea, Andreea
  Accountability and political 
representation of national 
minorities: a forgotten link? 
Evidence from Romania 
 
Andreea Cârstocea 
 
ECMI WORKING PAPER #65  
April 2013 
 ECMI- Working Paper 
 
 
2 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) is a 
non-partisan institution founded in 1996 by the 
Governments of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and the German State of 
Schleswig-Holstein. ECMI was established in 
Flensburg, at the heart of the Danish-German border 
region, in order to draw from the encouraging example 
of peaceful coexistence between minorities and 
majorities achieved here. ECMI’s aim is to promote 
interdisciplinary research on issues related to 
minorities and majorities in a European perspective 
and to contribute to the improvement of interethnic 
relations in those parts of Western and Eastern Europe 
where ethnopolitical tension and conflict prevail. 
ECMI Working Papers are written either by the staff of 
ECMI or by outside authors commissioned by the 
Centre. As ECMI does not propagate opinions of its 
own, the views expressed in any of its publications are 
the sole responsibility of the author concerned. 
 
ECMI Working Paper 
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) 
Director: Dr. Tove H. Malloy 
© ECMI 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 ECMI- Working Paper 
 
 
3 | P a g e  
 
Accountability and political 
representation of national minorities: a 
forgotten link? Evidence from Romania 
One of the dilemmas posed by descriptive representation is whether it might gener ate 
an excessive focus on who the representative is, rather than on what s/he does, thus 
foregoing the importance of substantive representation. As such, various scholars have 
argued that descriptive representation needs an accountability mechanism to ensu re 
that the representative does indeed pursue the interests of the minority group s/he 
represents. In this respect, most academic analyses agree that elections represent the 
most important mechanism of accountability. By making use of evidence from Romania , 
I argue that elections are a necessary but not sufficient condition for accountability, 
and that further mechanisms are needed to ensure the adequate representation of the 
interests of national minorities. The argument applies in particular to small, 
geographically dispersed minorities, which – as shown by evidence from Romania – face 
the highest challenges in holding to account their representatives. To do so, I first 
unravel the concept of political accountability as defined in the academic literature, 
then assess the accountability mechanisms (or lack thereof) embedded in the 
arrangements for descriptive representation of national minorities in Romania, and 
finally discuss their practical consequences for the representation of these groups. I 
conclude that due to ineffective vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms, 
political representation of small national minorities in Romania remains ‘captured’ by a 
closed circle of political elites, so that presently it is extremely difficult for their 
constituencies to remove them from leadership should they so desire.  
Andreea Cârstocea, April 2013 
ECMI Working Paper # 65 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In most European countries, the political 
representation of national minorities is carried 
out by means of descriptive representation, 
whereby minority groups are represented in 
national or federal Parliaments (or county or 
local councils) by members of these groups 
themselves, making use of various preferential 
electoral arrangements.
1
 The underlying general 
idea behind descriptive representation is that a 
descriptive representative – as member of the 
respective group and sharing the group’s  
 
characteristics, in other words being 'like' those 
represented – is in the best position to pursue the 
group’s interests. The implicit assumption for 
providing special measures for the descriptive 
representation of national minorities appears to 
be that ‘an increase in the number of 
representatives from historically disadvantaged 
groups can contribute to the substantive 
representation of these groups’.2 Indeed, 
academic literature appears to be in general 
agreement concerning the positive value of 
descriptive representation, with authors such as 
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Anne Phillips providing a range of justifications 
in its favour; among the justifications she 
provides are the role model argument (members 
of historically disadvantaged groups benefit 
from seeing members of their group in positions 
of power), the justice argument (descriptive 
representatives are necessary as compensation of 
past injustices), the ‘overlooked interests’ 
argument (descriptive representatives can 
contribute to putting on the political agenda 
minority interests ignored by the majority), and 
the ‘revitalized democracy’ argument (diverse 
representation is necessary for increased 
political participation and legitimacy of 
democratic institutions).
3
 
Interestingly, despite the existence of 
Europe-wide legal instruments and 
recommendations which refer directly to the 
issue of minority participation and 
representation,
4
 the normative literature on the 
descriptive representation of national minorities 
in Europe is conspicuously modest, with the 
overwhelming majority of studies on the subject 
of descriptive representation focusing on the 
descriptive representation of women and blacks 
in the U.S. While there are clear contextual 
differences between the representation of 
national minorities in Europe and the 
representation of women and blacks in the U.S., 
the insights offered by the existing literature on 
the descriptive representation of the latter can be 
usefully employed in debating the dilemmas and 
difficulties generated by descriptive 
representation of national minorities in Europe. 
One of the points of contention in the 
academic literature on descriptive representation 
is whether the mere presence of descriptive 
representatives in legislatures is sufficient for 
the adequate pursuit of that minority 
community’s interests. More specifically, the 
dilemma posed by descriptive representation is 
whether it generates an excessive focus on who 
the representative is, rather than on what s/he 
does, thus foregoing the importance of 
substantive representation (which arguably 
represents the most important factor in electing 
the representatives of majority populations). As 
such, Suzanne Dovi argues that one of the main 
theoretical problems facing proponents of 
descriptive representation lies in the apparent 
incompatibility between the politics of presence 
and accountability.
5
 This argument is also 
developed by scholars such as Hanna Pitkin, Iris 
Marion Young, or Jane Mansbridge, who argue 
that there is no direct correlation between who a 
descriptive representative is and what s/he does: 
‘the best descriptive representative is not 
necessarily the best representative for activity or 
government’.6 Even closer to the argument of 
this paper, Melissa Williams contends that 
descriptive representation needs an 
accountability mechanism to ensure that the 
representative does indeed pursue the interests 
of the marginalised group s/he represents; in her 
view, elections appear as the most important 
mechanisms of accountability in this respect.
7
 
Indeed, this is in line with the predominant 
perspectives in the general literature on 
accountability. 
By making use of evidence from Romania, 
this paper will argue that elections are a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for 
accountability, and that further mechanisms are 
needed to ensure the adequate representation of 
the interests of national minorities. The 
argument applies in particular to small, 
geographically dispersed minorities, which – as 
shown by evidence from Romania – face the 
highest challenges in holding to account their 
representatives. To do so, the paper will first 
attempt to unravel the concept of political 
accountability as defined in the academic 
literature, and will then assess the accountability 
mechanisms (or lack thereof) embedded in the 
arrangements for descriptive representation of 
small national minorities in Romania, and will 
discuss their practical consequences for the 
representation of these groups.
8
 The study will 
conclude that elections do not constitute a 
sufficiently effective mechanism of 
accountability, and that in the absence of other 
vertical or horizontal accountability 
mechanisms, political representation of small 
national minorities in Romania remains 
‘captured’ by a closed circle of political elites, 
so that it is virtually impossible for their 
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constituencies to remove them from leadership 
should they so desire. 
II. REPRESENTATION AND 
THE PARTICULAR 
RELEVANCE OF 
DEMOCRATIC LINKAGES 
FOR NATIONAL 
MINORITIES 
As mentioned above, most of the literature on 
the subject of accountability focuses on elections 
as the principal mechanism through which 
citizens can ensure that their representatives act 
in their best interest. As such, provided that 
elections are free, fair, and regular, it is 
generally assumed that the elected will pursue 
those policies that most benefit and reflect the 
interests of their constituencies. In this respect, 
two predominant understandings of 
representation are prevalent: the ‘mandate’ view 
sees elections as the vehicle through which 
citizens select those policies they want 
implemented and delegate representatives to 
carry them out. The other, opposing view, is that 
the representative is a ‘trustee’ of the citizens’ 
interests, and that once elected they should be 
free to exercise their best judgement as to what 
policies are in the best interest of the citizens; in 
this understanding of representation, elections 
serve the role of ‘holding to account’ 
representatives for their actions, citizens 
wielding the power to remove from office those 
they deem have acted in their detriment. While 
either view of representation has its own 
proponents, Hanna Pitkin approaches this classic 
debate by stating that the mandate vs. 
independence controversy poses a logically 
insoluble puzzle, since it asks us to choose 
between two elements that are both component 
parts of representation, one representing the 
initiation of the act of representation, and the 
other its termination.
9
 For the purposes of this 
paper, what should be taken from this debate is 
the existence of a necessary link between the 
representative and the represented, as one of the 
fundamental conditions of representation; more 
to the point, this paper will focus on the ways in 
which members of national minorities are able to 
hold to account their representatives, and thus 
‘terminate’ the act of representation, should they 
become unhappy with their elected 
representative. 
This link between the electorate and their 
representative is fundamental as, according to 
Andrew Roberts, it is the defining marker of a 
democracy. He argues that the quality of a 
democracy is equivalent to the degree to which 
citizens control their rulers, or alternatively to 
the strength of linkages between the citizens and 
their representatives, understood as the power to 
sanction incumbents, the power to select new 
officials, and the power to petition the 
government in between elections.
10
 In this 
context, the importance of accountability for 
democratic systems becomes therefore clear, 
with elections playing a central role in its 
operationalisation. But despite the 
overwhelming academic focus on elections, they 
are not the only mechanism for accountability 
that can be employed to ensure the strength of 
the links between the represented and their 
representatives; other mechanisms for increased 
accountability include for instance the activities 
of civil society, the input of opposition groups, 
and free access to information, as a facilitator of 
transparency. 
Arguably, these additional mechanisms for 
improving the accountability of leaders towards 
their constituencies are even more relevant in the 
case of national minorities, and their importance 
should not be disregarded. By most definitions, 
national minorities are ethno-cultural groups 
finding themselves in a non-dominant position, 
and as such their interests can be easily ignored, 
overlooked, or even discarded by legislators. 
The role of minority representatives is crucial to 
the promotion of the interests of their minority 
communities, and the need for strong links 
between the represented and the representative is 
even more important for national minority 
groups. Elections are obviously a fundamental 
element in holding minority representatives 
accountable to their constituencies, but, as 
evidence shows, they may not be a sufficient 
condition.  
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Indeed, the fact that many minority communities 
are small or geographically dispersed 
complicates the issue of interest representation 
and accountability, especially in the case of 
representatives to national parliaments. 
Moreover, where electoral arrangements allow 
for open electoral registers, these complicate the 
issue of accountability even further, as in such a 
case votes may come in an important proportion 
from outside the minority community. Will 
Kymlicka for instance argues against open 
electoral registers, claiming that it is not clear in 
what sense these would promote representation, 
as the representative is not necessarily 
accountable to the group, and may be simply 
ignoring its interests.
11
 He argues instead in 
favour of closed electoral registers, claiming that 
such a system increases accountability, as the 
representative is authorised and held accountable 
by the respective minority group.
12
  
For these reasons, this paper argues that in 
the case of national minorities additional, 
complementary mechanisms of accountability 
are needed to ensure that minority 
representatives are accountable to their 
constituencies, and are thus incentivised to 
develop and maintain strong links to their 
communities. The literature on the subject of 
political accountability offers some clues as to 
the types of accountability mechanisms that 
could contribute to improving democratic 
linkages between minority representatives and 
the communities they represent.  
III. DEFINING 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
A classic definition of accountability is that 
offered by Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, who 
maintain that governments are accountable if 
voters can discern whether these are ‘acting in 
their interest and [can] sanction them 
appropriately, so that those incumbents who act 
in the best interests of citizens win reelections, 
and those who do not lose them’.13 Jon Marie 
Moncrieffe acknowledges the fact that elections 
are indeed key to securing accountability within 
representative democracies, but stresses that 
other institutional mechanisms are needed to 
give the electorate an influence on policy 
making.
14
 
For the purposes of this paper, a broad 
definition of political accountability will be 
employed, along the lines proposed by Jonathan 
Fox, who defined it as limiting the use and 
sanctioning the abuse of political power.
15
 This 
definition does not restrict the understanding of 
accountability as dependent on elections, and 
allows for the conceptualisation of a broader 
spectrum of actors and mechanisms as bearing a 
potential effect on the levels of accountability in 
a society. Moreover, again following Jonathan 
Fox, who draws attention to the distinction 
between individual and institutional 
accountability, this paper will focus exclusively 
on the latter. Rather than focusing on corruption 
(as indicative of individual failure), institutional 
accountability concentrates more generally on 
institutional performance and thus seeks to 
address systemic flaws.
16
 For this reason, the 
analysis of the political representation of small 
minorities in Romania will be carried out by 
focusing exclusively on legal and institutional 
arrangements, and not on individual situations, 
which may very well however constitute the 
subject of future research. 
A fundamental distinction that helps 
clarify the meaning of political accountability is 
that between vertical and horizontal 
accountability. Vertical accountability refers to 
the power relations between citizens and the 
elected, as manifested through regular, free and 
fair elections; in addition, civil society and 
mass-media can hold to account (through 
articulating social demands, regular news 
coverage, etc) elected representatives.
 17
 
Horizontal accountability on the other hand 
refers to the system of checks and balances 
within the state, in the absence of which the 
minimum conditions for democracy can remain 
weak or incomplete.
18
 These systems of 
accountability do not exist independently, but 
complement and sustain each other; the 
corollary to this is that where institutions of 
horizontal accountability are weak, they have the 
potential to undermine vertical accountability 
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(e.g. inadequate election oversight bodies can 
permit less-than-democratic elections, thus 
allowing a break in the link between citizens and 
representatives).
19
 
It should be noted that this conceptual 
distinction between horizontal and vertical 
accountability (and their relationship) is not 
without its critics. According to some scholars, 
accountability cannot be horizontal, as a 
horizontal relationship assumes the equality of 
the institutions concerned, which in turn means 
that they cannot exercise answerability or 
accountability towards one another. As such, a 
‘horizontal’ relationship would not be 
understood as accountability, but rather as a 
‘relationship, exchange, or influence’;20 taking 
the argument even further, other scholars 
maintain that in order to preserve its analytic and 
heuristic value, accountability should be 
conceived only vertically.
21
 
For the purposes of the analysis developed 
in this paper however, both the distinction 
between horizontal and vertical accountability 
and the relevance of their interplay will be 
maintained, as it will most helpfully shed light 
on the functioning of the mechanisms for 
representation of national minorities in 
Romania. Indeed, if anything, the Romanian 
case analysed here is an additional argument in 
support of scholars who favour conceptualising 
accountability as a system wherein we can 
distinguish both a vertical and a horizontal 
dimension in an interdependent relationship. 
IV. TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Discourses about political accountability 
usually refer to transparency as a crucial 
condition for achieving accountability, without 
however offering much evidence in this 
respect.
22
 Indeed, there are research studies 
pointing to the negative effects of transparency 
on policymaking
23
 or to the potential conflict 
between excessive transparency and the need for 
governments to be competent decision-makers.
24
 
The ambivalence concerning the effectiveness of 
transparency as a tool to increase accountability 
may stem from two factors: first, the readiness 
with which elites readily offer more 
transparency in response to requests for more 
accountability (as if monitoring and reporting 
would represent the cure for all ills)
 25
 and 
second from a lack of clarity of what 
transparency actually means.  
Jonathan Fox helpfully distinguishes 
between ‘opaque’ or ‘fuzzy’ transparency and 
‘clear’ transparency, respectively. Opaque 
transparency refers to the information 
disseminated by public bodies which cannot be 
meaningfully used by members of the public, 
either because the data is released only 
nominally and does not in fact reveal how 
institutions reach their decisions, or what the 
results of their decisions are, or because the 
information is not reliable.
26
 Clear transparency 
on the other hand implies the release of 
meaningful, reliable information concerning the 
functioning and decision-making of a public 
body. 
It is perhaps this understanding of 
transparency as ‘clear’, meaningful release of 
information, that scholars refer to when they 
argue that transparency is crucial for 
accountability. Clear transparency is considered 
to have the potential to stem corrupt practices, 
allowing the electorate a more accurate 
perception of government policy.
27
 In the 
analysis of the transparency offered by elected 
minority representatives in Romania, it is this 
meaning that will be employed as a conceptual 
benchmark for assessing the information made 
available to the general public. 
It has been remarked that accountability as a 
concept, as well as its mechanisms and 
procedures, are generally absent from the public 
discourse on the new Central and East European 
democracies.
28
 In the case of Romania, 
generalised corruption and impunity are 
recognised problems of the political 
environment; while some accountability 
mechanisms have been formally put in place, 
their functioning is however not optimal, to say 
the least. 
 ECMI- Working Paper 
 
 
8 | P a g e  
 
There is an almost complete lack of 
academic literature discussing the issue of the 
accountability of minority representatives in 
Romania. This paper will attempt to contribute 
to this gap in knowledge, and in the following 
will analyse the existing mechanisms of 
accountability – vertical and horizontal – 
embedded in the system for the representation of 
national minorities. 
V. MECHANISMS OF VERTICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
ROMANIAN SYSTEM OF 
POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION FOR 
NATIONAL MINORITIES 
As mentioned above, vertical accountability 
refers to the possibility of citizens to exercise 
control over their representatives through 
electoral mechanisms, as well as to the power of 
civil society and media to hold them to account 
through their specific means. The following 
analysis will attempt to track the degree to 
which the electoral system, civil society and 
media in Romania constitute effective 
mechanisms of accountability, enabling minority 
communities to hold to account their elected 
representatives. 
1. Electoral arrangements for the 
representation of national 
minorities 
The 1991 Romanian Constitution provides for 
the parliamentary representation of minorities by 
allowing each minority that failed to pass the 
general electoral threshold to send one 
representative to the Chamber of Deputies.
29
 The 
electoral legislation subsequently enacted 
provided that organisations representing national 
minorities were permitted to contest national 
elections (thus being allowed to behave as 
parties, although legally they were registered as 
not-for-profit organisations) and that they 
benefited from a reduced electoral threshold of 
5% of the average number of votes received by a 
mainstream deputy,
30
 with the 5% threshold 
increasing to 10% in 2004.
31
 Importantly, in 
those cases where several organisations 
representing the same national minority 
competed for access to Parliament, the one 
receiving the highest number of votes would 
prevail (provided that it passed the reduced 
threshold), as only one representative per 
minority would be granted access to Parliament 
under these special conditions. A second 
important observation refers to the fact that the 
election of minority MPs is carried out by means 
of open registers; in other words, any person, of 
any ethnic background, situated in any part of 
the country, is allowed to cast his/her vote for a 
minority MP, with no restrictions as to who can 
cast a vote for a minority candidate.  Both 
mainstream and minority parties are registered 
on the same ballot, the voter being however 
permitted to cast one vote only. 
The reduced electoral threshold and the 
open register are two features that, as will be 
shown in the following, determine to a great 
extent the level of accountability that can be 
exercised by the minority communities over 
their representative. 
The reduced threshold for accessing 
national parliament is indeed fairly low, 
requiring an association to obtain in 1992 a 
minimum of 1,336 votes to pass the threshold, a 
minimum of 1,494 votes in 1996, 1,273 votes in 
2000, and respectively a minimum of 2,841 
votes in 2004.
32
 Nevertheless, this low number 
of minimum votes should be seen in the context 
of the size of these national minorities; as the 
table below shows, given the very small size of 
their minority communities, several candidates 
would have necessarily had to campaign for 
votes outside their constituencies, as their total 
population would have not been sufficient to 
ensure enough votes for passing the electoral 
threshold.
33
 This is in particular the case of very 
small minorities such as the Ruthenian (257 
persons), Albanian (477 persons), Macedonian 
(695 persons), Armenian (1,780 persons), Italian 
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(3,331 persons), or Polish (3,671 persons).
34
 
Furthermore, if we take into account the fact that 
a person can cast only one ballot, whether for a 
minority candidate or a mainstream one, we 
understand that even for slightly larger 
minorities campaigning outside the community 
becomes a necessity, as very possibly some of 
the members of that ethnic group might have a 
stronger preference for a mainstream party.
35
 
The election results listed in Table 1 
indicate that indeed this was the strategy 
employed by minority candidates, who in 
several cases managed to obtain many times 
more votes than the number of persons declaring 
themselves of the respective ethnic background: 
e.g. in the 2012 elections the Macedonian 
candidate obtained 17.5 times more votes than 
the number of people that declared their 
ethnicity as Macedonian in the 2002 census; in 
the 2000 elections, the Ruthenian candidate 
obtained 27 times more votes than the total 
number of Ruthenians in the country, while in 
the same elections the Albanian candidate 
obtained 22 times more votes than the total 
number of Albanians. Indeed, even slightly 
larger minorities obtained a quite high number 
of votes, with the Bulgarian candidate obtaining 
2.5 times more votes than the total number of 
Bulgarians in the country. 
Institutionally, the high number of votes 
obtained by minority candidates is explained by 
the existence of low thresholds for entering 
Parliament, in conjunction with the open register 
system, which allows any citizen to cast a vote 
for a minority MP. Candidates running for 
election on a minority ballot were thus provided 
with the opportunity to campaign for votes 
outside their communities, and as Table 1 
indicates, many did. Whether candidates chose 
to campaign in the same areas where the 
respective minority was concentrated (by 
appealing to voters living there but who have a 
different ethnic background), or whether they 
simply chose to target certain socio-economic 
categories (such as the current MP for the 
Bulgarian minority, who in addition to 
campaigning for votes from the Bulgarian 
community also portrays himself as an advocate 
for army personnel),
36
 obtaining these additional 
votes equates to an extension of the minority 
constituency, which the MP nominally 
represents in Parliament, to also include a non-
minority electorate. 
This extension of the constituency – 
although arguably necessary in order to pass the 
electoral threshold or to defeat a competitor 
running for the same minority mandate – 
presents a challenge to the issue of political 
accountability. Nominally, a minority MP is sent 
to Parliament to represent the interests of a 
particular ethnic group; after all, the measure of 
reduced thresholds was instituted in recognition 
of the problems faced by minority communities 
to articulate their interests at national level due 
to their low numbers. This implies that the 
constituency who is entitled to both authorise the 
MP as a representative and to hold him 
accountable are the members of that particular 
minority. Extending this constituency to include 
non-members of the minority community in turn 
implies that by receiving their votes the MP 
implicitly recognises that they too have a right to 
authorise and hold him accountable. This gives 
rise to a potential conflict of interests: suppose 
the second (‘external’) constituency becomes 
larger than the nominal one (for instance, that 
the military employees voting for the Bulgarian 
MP are more numerous than the members of the 
Bulgarian constituency) and comes to determine 
the outcome of the elections. How could the 
nominal minority hold to account the MP in 
such a situation, should they be outnumbered by 
the ‘external’ constituency? Could we still 
consider the MP in this situation as the 
representative of the respective minority? 
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Table 1 The number of votes obtained by successful organisations of national minorities in parliamentary elections 
Minority 2002  
Census 
Percentage 
of the total  
population 
Votes 
obtained 
in 2012 
Votes 
obtained 
in 2008 
Votes 
obtained 
in 2004 
Votes 
obtained 
in 2000 
Votes 
obtained 
in 1996 
Votes 
obtained 
in 1992 
Votes 
obtained 
in 1990 
Ruthenian 257 0.001% 5,265 4,514 2,871 6,942 0 0 0 
Albanian 477 0.002% 10,010 8,792 5,011 10,543 8,722 0 0 
Macedonian 695 0.003% 12,212 11,814 9,750 8,809 0 0 0 
Armenian 1,780 0.008% 10,761 13,892 9,810 21,302 11,543 7,145 399 
Italian 3,331 0.01% 7,943 9,567 6,168 21,263 11,454 4,188 0 
Polish 3,671 0.01% 8,023 7,670 5,473 5,055 1,842 3,031 2,372 
Jewish 5,870 0.02% 10,019 22,393 8,449 12,629 12,746 0 0 
Greek 6,513 0.02% 9,863 8,875 7,161 15,007 8,463 9,134 4,932 
Croat 6,786 0.03% 6,281 9,047 10,331 11,084 486 219 0 
Bulgarian 8,025 0.03% 10,155 14,039 15,283 20,085 5,359 1,906 3,451 
Czech and Slovak 21,137 0.09% 8,677 15,373 5,950 5,686 6,531 4,708 4,584 
Serb 22,518 0.10% 8,207 10,878 6,643 8,748 6,851 5,328 9,095 
Tartar 24,137 0.11% 9,291 11,868 6,452 10,380 6,319 7,699 0 
Turkish 32,596 0.14% 7,324 9,481 7,715 6,675 4,326 2,572 8,600 
Russian-Lipovan 36,397 0.16% 8,328 9,203 10,562 11,558 11,902 14,975 17,974 
German 60,088 0.27% 39,175 23,190 36,166 40,844 23,888 34,685 38,768 
Ukrainian 61,353 0.28% 7,353 9,338 10,888 9,404 7,165 7,717 16,179 
Roma 535,250 2.46% 22,124 44,037 56,076 71,786 82,195 52,704 29,162 
Source: For the 1990-2004 elections, Călușer, ‘Reprezentarea minorităților naționale pe locurile rezervate în parlament’, p.177. For the 2008 elections, Central 
Electoral Bureau, Proces verbal privind rezultatele alegerilor pentru Camera Deputaților, 30 noiembrie 2008. Available at 
http://www.becparlamentare2008.ro/rezultate.html. (Accessed 31 January 2011). For the 2012 elections, Central Electoral Bureau, Proces verbal privind 
partidele politice, organizațiile cetățenilor aparținând minorităților naționale, alianțele politice, alianțele electorale care întrunesc/nu întrunesc pragul 
electoral și candidații independenți care au obținut majoritatea voturilor valabil exprimate în colegiile în care au candidat pentru Camera Deputaților respectiv 
pentru Senat, 9 decembrie 2012. Available at http://www.becparlamentare2012.ro/A-DOCUMENTE/Rezultate%20intermediare/anexa%204.pdf (Accessed 26 
January 2013)
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A solution to these dilemmas is not 
immediately obvious. The emergence of the 
‘ethno-business’ phenomenon in Hungary in the 
late 1990s (a term referring to various abuses of 
the legislation for the protection of national 
minorities) led to a change in the electoral 
legislation in 2005. These changes included the 
institution of a closed electoral register, with 
anyone wishing to vote for a minority candidate 
having to register first on a minority electoral 
roll. Additionally, restrictions were also imposed 
on minority candidates, who must now declare 
their knowledge of the language, culture, and 
traditions of the respective national minority. 
These measures were instituted with a view to 
ending various abuses made possible by 
previous legislation (which among others 
included an open electoral register); to date, due 
to a lack of consistent research, the positive 
effects of these changes are not yet clear, but 
scholars remain generally sceptical in this 
respect.
37
 
2. Alternative minority non-
governmental organisations as a 
pre-condition of vertical 
accountability in Romania  
Also pertaining to the realm of vertical 
accountability are the pressures put by civil 
society on governments and political 
representatives, as such pressures are generally 
considered as raising standards and public 
expectations of state performance, encouraging 
oversight institutions to act, and may be even 
conducive to the enactment of institutional 
checks and balances where these are lacking.
38
 
In the present case, civil society would consist of 
minority organisations able to challenge the 
minority representatives where they do not agree 
with his/her policies, and who are regularly 
consulted on matters of interest for the 
respective national minority group. 
The first contemporary organisations of 
national minorities appeared immediately after 
the change of regime in 1989; legally they were 
set up as ‘associations’, a term equivalent to 
‘non-governmental organisations’. Soon 
afterwards, the 1990 law regulating Romanian 
parliamentary and presidential elections 
provided that, although the legal status of these 
minority non-governmental organisations was 
different from that of a political party (so 
normally would not be allowed to contest 
elections), an exception would be made, so that 
should they wish to take part in elections, they 
would be allowed to do so.
39
 This exception to 
the general rule of elections has been maintained 
throughout the various changes and 
modifications of the electoral legislation, and 
remains in force today.   
Another institutional innovation was the 
creation of the Council for National Minorities 
(Consiliul pentru Minorități Naționale - CMN), 
set up in 1993 as a consultative body of the 
Romanian government under the direct authority 
of the General Secretary of the Government. 
Although initially it was designed to bring 
together all organisations representing national 
minorities,
40
 in 2001 the Council (renamed the 
Council of National Minorities - Consiliul 
Minorităților Naționale) was re-organised and 
stipulated that only those organisations that 
obtained a seat in Parliament could become 
members of this body.
41
 As such, according to 
the new regulations, each minority, regardless of 
its size or socio-economic characteristics, was 
allowed to send only one representative 
organisation to the Council, namely the one that 
succeeded in passing the electoral threshold for 
parliamentary representation. 
While beneficial to minority 
communities, who were exempt from the rigors 
of establishing political parties and thus obtained 
an easier path into parliamentary representation, 
in conjunction with the setting up of the CMN, 
this exception to the general rule of elections 
had an important side-effect. It created a blur 
between civil society and elected political 
representatives, with part of the civil society (as 
made up of parliamentary minority non-
governmental organisations) became identified 
with the state: the organisations which gained 
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parliamentary representation received the entire 
allocation of public funds for that respective 
minority, they become exclusive members of the 
Council of National Minorities for that minority, 
and the respective minority MP decides on 
general policy for minority communities by 
participating in parliamentary debates.  
Of course, civil society is not reduced to 
a single non-governmental organisation; there is 
no restriction on the number of minority NGOs 
that can be set up, and in the case of most 
national minorities there are several such 
organisations. However, as noted in the 2005 
Opinion of the Advisory Committee on 
Romania, non-parliamentary organisations are 
entirely excluded from both consultation and 
state support, as the organisation present in 
Parliament is the exclusive representative in 
CMN and the exclusive recipient of the entire 
financial allocation for the respective minority.
42
 
This means that many of these alternative 
organisations struggle to survive, many of them 
disband from lack of financial resources, so that 
they cannot constitute a credible opposition to 
the formal parliamentary representative.  
On the other hand, the organisation 
representing a particular minority in parliament 
can no longer fulfil the role of ‘pressure group’ 
carefully watching and taxing the state’s policies 
for the respective minority. With exclusive 
access to governmental consultation and public 
funds (which it has the freedom to spend as it 
deems appropriate), it becomes, de facto, a state 
actor. The same 2005 Opinion further points out 
the politicisation of the parliamentary 
organisations as a result of their dependency on 
state funding and the lack of pluralism in the 
Council.
43
 
All these issues point to a potentially 
problematic type of vertical accountability as 
exercised by civil society; where non-
parliamentary organisations are both denied 
access to state support and are also excluded 
from consultations on matters concerning their 
respective minority communities, we cannot 
meaningfully speak of civil society as a means 
to ensure vertical accountability for minority 
representatives. 
3. Mass-media as a generator of 
vertical accountability 
Mass-media is generally regarded as one of the 
very important means through which political 
accountability can be achieved; academic 
literature on the subject has repeatedly shown 
that media capture bears a series of negative 
effects on political outcomes
44
 and that for it to 
be able to function as a generator of political 
accountability, a few conditions are necessary. 
The most prominent refer to the existence of 
media pluralism (since the presence of a large 
number of independent media organisations 
makes it less likely that the state is able to 
control the provision of news) and a high degree 
of media independence (measured by the 
difficulty with which the state is able to transfer 
resources to the media).
45
 
Of course, these theoretical 
considerations refer to mainstream media and its 
capacity to generate vertical accountability at 
national or at least regional level. While of 
course avoiding a mechanical application of 
these general principles to the particular 
situation of small national minorities, these 
considerations are however extremely useful in 
guiding our analysis. It would be indeed difficult 
to apply the criterion of the plurality of the 
media in the case of small minorities. Given that 
these are ethnic groups with a membership of 
several thousand persons, we cannot reasonably 
expect the existence of several minority 
language newspapers competing for such a 
numerically low readership; as will become 
evident, in the absence of media plurality, the 
criteria of media independence becomes ever 
more important. 
If we are to consider the kinds of media 
that can reach small minorities in Romania, we 
can broadly speak about two types of media: 
mainstream media (in Romanian language, 
whether at local or national level), and minority 
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media (in the minority language or bilingual, 
and as shown below, subsidised by the state). 
Given the reduced demographic weight of small 
national minority communities, mainstream 
media (printed or the audio-visual), even at local 
level, is rarely concerned with these 
communities’ issues; being privately owned 
means that their main focus is on reaching a 
wider public and thus that they are not 
concerned with covering the news of what 
constitutes a minute part of their readership. As 
such, small minorities’ issues rarely make it to 
mainstream media headlines.  
Conversely, minority printed mass-
media is concerned almost exclusively with the 
issues pertaining to those respective small ethnic 
communities, and is targeting a very specific 
readership. Most of them are published in the 
respective minority language, with some of them 
including a Romanian version; importantly, 
there is usually just one newspaper per minority 
language, with some newspapers having 
regional versions to accommodate the 
geographical dispersion of the community. 
Here, the issue of media independence 
becomes central to the role of the media as a 
promoter of political accountability. Newspapers 
in the languages of national minorities are 
almost entirely subsidised by the state. While 
state support for minority language media is 
encouraged by European minority legal 
instruments (such as Art. 9 of the FCNM), what 
is particularly important here is how this state 
support is offered to minority communities. 
Again, we meet the same exclusive emphasis on 
minority organisations members of the Council 
of National Minorities, with financial support 
being channelled via the Council for National 
Minorities to parliamentary organisations.
46
 This 
means that minority publications are funded 
exclusively through these organisations, and as 
such are dependent on them. Indeed, these 
newspapers are advertised by these organisations 
as being their ‘own’ publications,47 and rifling 
through the editorial cassettes of these 
publications, one finds that sometimes editors in 
chief are members or even presidents of these 
organisations.
48
   
Also, Romanian legislation provides 
special rules for the audio-visual media, offering 
broadcasting space in the languages of national 
minorities on public television, which broadcasts 
a series of programmes in a variety of minority 
languages, with Hungarian, German, and Roma 
being given a greater weight. In terms of the 
audio-visual acting as a promoter of 
accountability, the same issue as in the case of 
printed media emerges: Romania’s first state 
report on the implementation of the FCNM 
mentions that ‘organisations of persons 
belonging to national minorities which have 
representatives in Parliament are provided with 
broadcasting time in accordance with the law, 
free of charge and without any interference.’49 
The problematic aspect here, from the point of 
view of accountability, is the exclusive access 
given to those minority organisations 
represented in Parliament, meaning that non-
parliamentary organisations are excluded from 
access to the mass-media, and that the 
perspectives present on national television are 
those of just one organisation per national 
minority. 
We find therefore a fundamental flaw in 
the design of state support for these minority 
publications. By channelling state funds through 
the minority organisations present in Parliament, 
printed publications are made financially 
entirely dependent on these; in addition, the 
audio-visual broadcasts also give exclusive 
access to these organisations. It can be safely 
said therefore that minority mass-media has 
become ‘captured’ by the parliamentary 
organisation of any given minority. This 
‘capture’ becomes ever more evident where the 
leadership of the organisation conflates with the 
editorial leadership of that publication. Under 
the current circumstances, it would be 
unthinkable to imagine a non-parliamentary 
organisation being able to advertise during the 
electoral campaign in a minority newspaper, as 
for that matter it would be quite unthinkable to 
imagine a minority newspaper printing a an 
article critical of the parliamentary organisation 
or the respective minority MP.  This is so in 
spite of the fact that these are not privately 
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sponsored media but funded from public money 
earmarked for national minority communities. 
With little mainstream media attention 
paid to the issues of small national minorities, 
and with minority media ‘captured’ by those 
organisations present in Parliament and 
members of the CMN, we cannot 
comprehensibly speak of media as a promoter of 
political accountability. Indeed, it appears that 
whatever information is made available to the 
public concerning these ethnic groups, it is made 
through these organisations, leaving little space 
for dissenting opinions and alternative views. 
This in turn means that the minority 
constituency (and potential voters in coming 
elections) is overwhelmingly exposed to the 
news and information provided by media 
controlled by the political elites presently in 
power, with very limited scope for obtaining 
information from alternative, independent 
sources. 
VI. MECHANISMS OF 
HORIZONTAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
ROMANIAN SYSTEM OF 
POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION FOR 
NATIONAL MINORITIES 
As shown above, most scholars agree that the 
existence of mechanisms of vertical 
accountability alone is not a sufficient condition 
for ensuring that political representatives will act 
in the best interests of the citizens they 
represent. The importance of an additional 
mechanism of horizontal checks and balances 
between institutions is considered crucial to the 
creation of strong democratic linkages between 
the representatives and their constituencies; 
indeed it is difficult to conceive of mechanisms 
of vertical accountability functioning adequately 
in the absence of constitutional guarantees, of a 
balanced institutional setting ensuring the 
dispersal of power, or of the political 
independence of those authorities who 
investigate and prosecute abuses.
50
 The checks 
and balances embedded in the institutional 
setting will ideally also prevent manipulation by 
any one party, majority, or individual,
51
 thus 
avoiding capture by political or economic elites. 
In the assessment of the horizontal 
accountability mechanisms of the Romanian 
system for the political representation of small 
minorities, this paper will focus in particular on 
the checks and balances preventing manipulation 
by interested parties and on the mechanisms of 
financial transparency and accountability. 
Indeed, while many experts take for granted the 
efficiency of transparency mechanisms on 
creating accountability, some scholars argue that 
actual evidence on transparency’s impact on 
accountability is not as strong as one might 
expect.
52
 Without attempting to solve this 
theoretical dilemma, this paper will take as a 
starting point the idea that transparency 
concerning how public funds are spent creates 
an element of trust in the general public, and that 
it has at least some impact on political 
accountability, however hard it is to quantify 
this impact. As such, the analysis will focus on 
both the levels of transparency available for 
assessing the use of public money allocated by 
the state for national minorities, and also on the 
financial accountability this public expenditure 
entails in the Romanian system of protection of 
national minorities. 
1. Horizontal checks and balances 
embedded in the institutional 
system so as to preclude 
manipulation by any one party 
An analysis of whether the system of 
representation of national minorities precludes 
its manipulation by any interested party will 
have to start from the changes to the electoral 
legislation that were made in 2004 and 2008 
respectively, and trying afterwards to understand 
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who benefits from these changes and who 
initiated them.  
As mentioned earlier, the constitution 
guarantees the representation of national 
minorities in parliament by providing that each 
minority has the right to one representative to 
the Chamber of Deputies. While the electoral 
legislation remained relatively stable until 2004, 
providing for the right of minority non-
governmental organisations to enter the electoral 
competition and to benefit from a reduced 
threshold of 5% of the average number of votes 
received by a mainstream deputy,
53
 in 2004, and 
then again in 2008, the law was substantially 
amended, with important consequences for 
minority organisations competing for entry into 
Parliament.  
In 2004, for the first time in post-1989 
legislation, the law introduced a definition of 
‘national minority’. Until then, in the absence of 
such a definition, any organisation that included 
in its statute references to the protection and 
promotion of the rights of a certain ethnic group 
was allowed to contest elections, and provided 
that it passed the reduced electoral threshold it 
could send a representative to Parliament. The 
2004 legislation was modified to provide that a 
national minority was ‘that ethnic group which 
is represented in the Council of National 
Minorities’.54 The inclusion of this definition in 
the electoral legislation had an important 
consequence for non-governmental 
organisations wishing to enter the electoral 
competition: as in 2004 there were 20 ethnic 
groups represented in the CMN, from then on no 
other ethnic group could attempt entry to 
Parliament. This is because of the legal 
circularity arising from linking the definition of 
a national minority to the presence of that ethnic 
group in the CMN. The law regulating the 
setting up of the CMN clearly states that only 
those organisations already present in Parliament 
may become members of this body.
55
 However, 
any ethnic group not represented in the Council 
who presently wishes to be granted the status of 
national minority can only do so if it becomes a 
member of the Council of National Minorities. 
This results in a vicious circle, with the result 
that any ethnic group that is not already 
represented in Parliament and the Council of 
National Minorities is excluded from 
representation. As an example, in the 2004 
elections (which took place after the changes to 
the electoral legislation were adopted), the 
Uniunea Secuilor din România (Union of 
Szeklers in Romania), as representative of the 
Szekler ethnic group, was refused access to the 
electoral competition. The Central Electoral 
Bureau rejected their application, on grounds 
that this ethnic community was not a member of 
the CMN, as required under the new law.
56
  
Also in 2004, a second major change to 
the electoral legislation for national minorities 
concerned the threshold for entering Parliament 
on a national minority mandate, which was 
raised from 5% to 10% of the average number of 
votes received by a deputy.
57
 The third major 
change provided that minority organisations 
already present in Parliament may run freely in 
elections
58
 but non-parliamentary organisations 
representing national minorities were required to 
present a list of members amounting to 15% of 
the persons who declared their ethnicity as 
coinciding to that national minority in the 
previous census.
59
 These final changes instituted 
in 2004, although giving an indisputable 
advantage to those organisations already present 
in Parliament and creating additional hurdles for 
alternative organisations wishing to contest 
elections (provided they wanted to represent an 
ethnic group already recognised as a national 
minority),
60
 did not make electoral participation 
impossible. Proof of this is the example of the 
Macedonian minority, for whose parliamentary 
representation three associations contested the 
2004 elections.  
However, things became more 
complicated in 2008, with the introduction of a 
further amendment in the Electoral Law. This 
amendment provided the obligation of non-
parliamentary organisations wishing to contest 
elections to demonstrate their status as ‘public 
utility association’, in addition to the list of 
members comprising at least 15% of the total 
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number of citizens who in the latest census 
declared themselves as belonging to that 
ethnicity.
61
 At this point, the competition for the 
minority organisations already represented in 
Parliament was completely removed. This was 
so because competitor, non-parliamentary 
organisations had to obtain the status of ‘public 
utility’ before contesting elections, which can 
only be obtained through a Government 
Decision.
62
 To date, this condition proved 
impossible to fulfil, with no organisation 
obtaining this status despite several applications 
to the Romanian Government. 
These successive changes to the 
electoral legislation clearly benefitted those 
minority organisations already members of 
Parliament, as these changes gradually removed 
the possibility for alternative, competitor 
organisations to challenge them in elections. 
Going back to the issue of institutional 
manipulation and the existence of checks and 
balances to prevent it, a quick look at the list of 
the initiators of changes in the electoral 
legislation is quite telling. The list of initiators of 
the 2004 Electoral Law includes the leader of 
the Parliamentary Group of National Minorities 
among the signatories;
63
 similarly, among the 
initiators of the 2008 Electoral Law we find 
three minority MPs, including the leader of the 
Parliamentary Group.
64
 Furthermore, looking at 
how minority MPs voted for the 2008 Electoral 
Law (no records of the vote are available for the 
2004 Electoral Law), we find that all 14 
minority MPs present in Parliament for the final 
vote voted unanimously in favour of the 
electoral legislation.
65
 
As such, we can safely say that the 
representation of small national minorities has 
become ‘captured’ by the current parliamentary 
organisations and their leaders. Unless an 
overhaul of the electoral legislation occurs, these 
organisations and their respective leaders will be 
the only ones able to contest future elections. 
However, one cannot be but sceptical about any 
immediate changes to the present legislation, as 
it is these very organisations and leaders that 
decide on electoral legislation. In the absence of 
any meaningful consultation with other, non-
parliamentary, minority organisations, these 
current representatives have neither the 
incentives nor do they face real pressure to push 
for such changes. 
2. Financial transparency and 
accountability 
Each year, the state budget includes a lump 
amount of public funds earmarked for national 
minorities, which are made available to the 
Council of National Minorities; following 
negotiations among the organisations members 
of the Council, each organisation receives an 
amount of money to be used for the promotion 
of interests of the national minority it represents 
in Parliament. 
An organisation successful in sending a 
representative to Parliament benefits therefore 
from a very important advantage: it is the sole 
recipient of the state budget allocations for that 
respective minority and solely decides on how 
these amounts will be used in any particular 
year. This means that all other minority 
organisations who do not have parliamentary 
representation and who are therefore excluded 
from the Council of National Minorities are also 
excluded from receiving any direct financial 
support from the state and from consultation on 
how these funds would be best spent.
66
 
With public funds made available for 
national minorities being entirely managed by 
the respective parliamentary minority 
organisation, financial transparency and 
accountability become a very important issue. 
In terms of transparency, there is no 
legal requirement to make the accounts of these 
organisations public, despite the fact that they 
are managing public funds. As such, the access 
of the general public to these documents is 
largely dependent on the goodwill of the leaders 
of these organisations. During a series of 
interviews carried out in Romania in 2010 with 
– among others – leaders of various non-
parliamentary minority organisations, a recurrent 
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aspect were their complaints concerning their 
lack of access to information about the use of the 
public funding for their respective minority 
communities. According to my interviewees, 
their repeated requests for disclosure of 
information on how these amounts were spent 
were constantly met with refusal.  
This lack of transparency is a reflection 
of the legislation regulating the use of public 
funds earmarked for national minorities. 
According to the law, the Department for 
Interethnic Relations (public institution 
subordinated to the Prime Minister) is the body 
in charge with monitoring of how these funds 
are spent.67 
In practical terms, parliamentary 
minority organisations have the obligation to 
submit to the Department for Inter-Ethnic 
Relations a statement declaring the amounts 
spent and the general purpose for the 
expenditure (‘mass-media’, ‘administrative 
costs’, ‘projects’ etc.), with no other additional 
documentation required (i.e. invoices, receipts, 
procedures for organising tenders and their 
outcomes, etc.). The degree of detail of these 
reports is not established by any regulation, and 
as such there is no incentive for representatives 
of these organisations in going beyond offering 
the bare minimum of information necessary. 
Indeed, the records held by the Department of 
Interethnic Relations are extremely cursory – at 
their most detailed, they include the total 
amounts spent by an organisation for a few types 
of expenses (‘mass-media’, ‘administrative 
costs’, ‘projects’ etc.) per year. No information 
is available concerning the funds spent on 
individual projects and what rules of expenditure 
were used, making the information available 
impossible to use.  
In more theoretical terms, this situation 
would fall in Fox’s category of ‘opaque’ or 
‘fuzzy’ transparency outlined above. Whatever 
information is made available (total amounts 
allocated per minority, records of the 
Department for Interethnic Relations, etc.), it is 
presented in such a manner that a fair 
assessment of the way in which these funds are 
used is rendered virtually impossible. As such, it 
is quite difficult to speak of financial 
accountability in relation to parliamentary 
organisations representing small national 
minorities. In the absence of public scrutiny and 
in the absence of any institutional pressure to 
provide adequate information and justification 
on how they spend the funds earmarked for their 
communities, minority representatives cannot be 
meaningfully be said to be accountable. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Criticisms of descriptive representation as being 
too much focused on who the representative is 
and as such deflecting attention from substantive 
representation (what the representative does) are 
robustly substantiated by the evidence obtained 
from the analysis of the Romanian system for 
the political representation of small national 
minorities. 
This paper has based its analysis of the 
accountability mechanisms (or lack thereof) 
embedded in the Romanian system of political 
representation of national minorities on the latest 
developments in the academic literature 
concerning political accountability. The 
distinction between vertical and horizontal 
mechanisms of accountability and their 
particular characteristics was thus most helpful 
in unravelling the relationship between 
descriptive representation and accountability in 
Romania. As shown above, vertical 
accountability is strongly undermined by the 
existence of an open electoral register, which 
makes elected representatives difficult to hold to 
account by the minority communities; with 
minority mass-media ‘captured’ by political 
representatives and with an ineffective civil 
society to challenge representatives, one cannot 
meaningfully speak of vertical accountability in 
the case of minority representatives. 
Horizontally the situation is not much better: 
instead of instituting effective checks and 
balances, the system allows those already in 
power to mould the legislation in such a manner 
as to preserve the status quo and to remove all 
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competition; coupled with the lack of rules 
concerning transparency and accountability of 
spending the public funds allocated for each 
minority group, this in turn points to an almost 
complete lack of horizontal mechanisms of 
accountability for elected minority 
representatives. 
As such, the idea that elections represent 
a sufficient (or at least, effective) mechanism of 
accountability in the case of descriptive 
representation appears of limited validity. As 
this paper has attempted to show, not only is a 
multiplicity of accountability mechanisms 
needed, but they also need to be effective. 
Despite the nominal existence of vertical 
mechanisms in Romania, their poor functioning, 
coupled with minimum horizontal mechanisms 
of accountability allow one to go as far as argue 
that at this point the representation of small 
national minorities is ‘captured’ by a closed 
circle of political elites. 
In a sense, one could argue that the 
representation of small national minorities in 
Romania has now become de facto a form of 
corporatist representation, yet maintaining all 
the appearances of a pluralist system of 
representation. It is perhaps on this very aspect 
that academic reflection is most needed: would a 
model of corporate representation be indeed a 
better fit for the interests of small minorities? 
And, if so, how could a corporate form of 
interest representation accommodate adequate 
mechanisms of vertical and horizontal 
accountability?  
In the absence of an academic debate on 
the subject of corporatist versus pluralist 
representation of national minorities, and in the 
absence of a public debate on the problems of 
the Romanian system of political representation 
for small national minorities, a lot of questions 
remain to be answered. 
As far as the Romanian case is 
concerned, given the present situation, one can 
only hope that minority parliamentary 
organisations and their leaders, although 
virtually unaccountable, will act to the benefit of 
the communities they represent and pursue their 
interests faithfully. That is however another 
subject, for another article. 
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